New paper in Mind & Language

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Written By Kristin Andrews

The marker approach is taken as best practice for answering the distribution question: Which animals are conscious? However, the methodology can be used to increase confidence in animals many presume to be unconscious, including C. elegans, leading to a trilemma: accept the worms as conscious; reject the specific markers; or reject the marker methodology for answering the distribution question. I defend the third option and argue that answering the distribution question requires a secure theory of consciousness. Accepting the hypothesis all animals are conscious will promote research leading to secure theory, which is needed to create reliable consciousness tests for animals and AIs. Rather than asking the distribution question, we should shift to the dimensions question: How are animals conscious?

Read it here.

 

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The week of animal social norms!
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Two new papers on social norms in animals:

In Search of Animal Normativity: A framework for studying social norms in non-human animals in Biological Reviews focuses on how to identify behavioral patterns in animal communities that are socially maintained, and thus have the hallmark of social norms.

This was big team philosophy & science. Evan Westra, Simon Fitzpatrick, Sarah F. Brosnan, Thibaud Gruber, Catherine Hobaiter, Lydia M. Hopper, Daniel Kelly, Christopher Krupenye, Lydia V. Luncz, Jordan Theriault, Kristin Andrews

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New paper in Mind & Language
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New paper in Mind & Language
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“All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science

The marker approach is taken as best practice for answering the distribution question: Which animals are conscious? However, the methodology can be used to increase confidence in animals many presume to be unconscious, including C. elegans, leading to a trilemma: accept the worms as conscious; reject the specific markers; or reject the marker methodology for answering the distribution question. I defend the third option and argue that answering the distribution question requires a secure theory of consciousness. Accepting the hypothesis all animals are conscious will promote research leading to secure theory, which is needed to create reliable consciousness tests for animals and AIs. Rather than asking the distribution question, we should shift to the dimensions question: How are animals conscious?

Read it here.

Read More →
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Kristin Andrews

Kristin Andrews is Professor of Philosophy and York Research Chair in Animal Minds. She is the author of several books on animal mind, consciousness, sociality, morality, and methods in the science of animal mind studies.

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