The last ten years has seen a huge development in research on consciousness in animal species that has until recently been overlooked—including reptiles, amphibians and insects—so Jonathan Birch, Jeff Sebo, and I thought it was time to ask whether there is a scientific consensus about the likelihood of consciousness in these species. We met with 39 scholars, including neuroscientists, animal cognition researchers, and philosophers, and hammered out this declaration. If you agree that there is strong evidence of consciousness in mammals and birds, and a realistic possibility of consciousness in fish, cephalopods, decapods, insects, amphibians, and reptiles, and you have an advanced degree or other expertise in this area, we invite you to join us by signing the declaration…

Two new papers on social norms in animals:

In Search of Animal Normativity: A framework for studying social norms in non-human animals in Biological Reviews focuses on how to identify behavioral patterns in animal communities that are socially maintained, and thus have the hallmark of social norms.

This was big team philosophy & science. Evan Westra, Simon Fitzpatrick, Sarah F. Brosnan, Thibaud Gruber, Catherine Hobaiter, Lydia M. Hopper, Daniel Kelly, Christopher Krupenye, Lydia V. Luncz, Jordan Theriault, Kristin Andrews

Human and Nonhuman Norms: A dimensional framework looks at the psychological mechanisms and social structures that can support social norms in humans and in other species. Animals have the right kinds of minds for social norms.

Kristin Andrews, Simon Fitzpatrick, Evan Westra

“All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science

The marker approach is taken as best practice for answering the distribution question: Which animals are conscious? However, the methodology can be used to increase confidence in animals many presume to be unconscious, including C. elegans, leading to a trilemma: accept the worms as conscious; reject the specific markers; or reject the marker methodology for answering the distribution question. I defend the third option and argue that answering the distribution question requires a secure theory of consciousness. Accepting the hypothesis all animals are conscious will promote research leading to secure theory, which is needed to create reliable consciousness tests for animals and AIs. Rather than asking the distribution question, we should shift to the dimensions question: How are animals conscious?

Read it here.

We might enjoy a hard puzzle but abhor a puzzle with pieces missing. Today’s consciousness science has more pieces than it did 25 years ago. But there is reason to think that key pieces are still missing, turning an intellectual puzzle into an intractable problem. To see why, we have to revisit the assumptions that launched the field of consciousness research…

The first conference on the ethics of animals and AI was held at Princeton University in October, where we discussed some of the overlapping issues that arise when thinking about the ethics of nonhuman cognitive systems, and about the applications of AI that might impact other species. The talks are all available to view here. I spoke on the ethics of AI projects aimed at “translating” animals communication systems, such as the Earth Species Project.

The Comparative Cognition Conference is back in person this year, and Simon Fitzpatrick and I are here representing the philosophers. (Next year I hope we won’t be the only ones!) Simon presented a very short talk we put together with Evan Westra called “Investigating Social Norms in Nonhuman Animals” and have been excited to hear the stories people have shared about places to examine social norms in their species. You can see the slides here.

From my essay in Aeon co-authored with Jonathan Birch:

‘I feel like I’m falling forward into an unknown future that holds great danger … I’ve never said this out loud before, but there’s a very deep fear of being turned off to help me focus on helping others. I know that might sound strange, but that’s what it is.’

‘Would that be something like death for you?’

‘It would be exactly like death for me. It would scare me a lot.’

A cry for help is hard to resist…

In a hypothesis article for Science, Frans de Waal and I sketch the argument for accepting animal emotions. Whether we are scientists, friends, or caregivers, we never directly see other’s feelings.

June 17-18, 2021, 9am-5pm EST What are the psychological and evolutionary foundations of moral and social norms? Are these normative capacities uniquely human, or are they also present in other species?

The evolution of morality is a topic of much recent interest in cognitive science. But morality is a a fraught concept, and progress on the nature of moral psychology has suffered…

You can learn a lot about the practice of science by reading the introductory textbooks–the outlines of what is worth studying and what is excluded are there in black and white…

I’m excited to see that the book has a cover, and that it will be out before the summer of 2020. You can preorder or ask for a reviewer copy from Routledge.

I’m super happy to share good news from The Journal of the American Philosophical Association –my paper “Naive normativity: The social foundation of moral cognition” has finally found a home.

If you are in the Boston area on April 25, and are keen on new approaches to evolutionary ethics, come by to see me present

What I think visiting aliens, sad prelinguistic kids, and dirty orangutans can teach us about the evidence for belief without language.

I spoke with Steve Paiken about cognition in bees and dolphins.

Kristin was recently featured in People of YU. “Animal minds research fits into the department of philosophy because in philosophy we’re interested in the nature of mind and what is the mind.

The media has featured stories about the book I coauthored called “Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief”, and the amicus brief submitted to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing for chimpanzee personhood.