If you are in the Boston area on April 25, and are keen on new approaches to evolutionary ethics, come by to see me present on a framework for finding animal social norms in other species. I'm looking forward to hearing all these talks! Thanks to Victor Kumar for the invitation and organizational work.
The last ten years has seen a huge development in research on consciousness in animal species that has until recently been overlooked—including reptiles, amphibians and insects—so Jonathan Birch, Jeff Sebo, and I thought it was time to ask whether there is a scientific consensus about the likelihood of consciousness in these species. We met with 39 scholars, including neuroscientists, animal cognition researchers, and philosophers, and hammered out this declaration. If you agree that there is strong evidence of consciousness in mammals and birds, and a realistic possibility of consciousness in fish, cephalopods, decapods, insects, amphibians, and reptiles, and you have an advanced degree or other expertise in this area, we invite you to join us by signing the declaration…
Two new papers on social norms in animals:
In Search of Animal Normativity: A framework for studying social norms in non-human animals in Biological Reviews focuses on how to identify behavioral patterns in animal communities that are socially maintained, and thus have the hallmark of social norms.
This was big team philosophy & science. Evan Westra, Simon Fitzpatrick, Sarah F. Brosnan, Thibaud Gruber, Catherine Hobaiter, Lydia M. Hopper, Daniel Kelly, Christopher Krupenye, Lydia V. Luncz, Jordan Theriault, Kristin Andrews
Human and Nonhuman Norms: A dimensional framework looks at the psychological mechanisms and social structures that can support social norms in humans and in other species. Animals have the right kinds of minds for social norms.
Kristin Andrews, Simon Fitzpatrick, Evan Westra
“All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science
The marker approach is taken as best practice for answering the distribution question: Which animals are conscious? However, the methodology can be used to increase confidence in animals many presume to be unconscious, including C. elegans, leading to a trilemma: accept the worms as conscious; reject the specific markers; or reject the marker methodology for answering the distribution question. I defend the third option and argue that answering the distribution question requires a secure theory of consciousness. Accepting the hypothesis all animals are conscious will promote research leading to secure theory, which is needed to create reliable consciousness tests for animals and AIs. Rather than asking the distribution question, we should shift to the dimensions question: How are animals conscious?
Read it here.
Kristin Andrews is Professor of Philosophy and York Research Chair in Animal Minds. She is the author of several books on animal mind, consciousness, sociality, morality, and methods in the science of animal mind studies.
