Books

How to Study Animal Minds

Comparative psychology, the multidisciplinary study of animal behavior and psychology, confronts the challenge of how to study animals we find cute and easy to anthropomorphize, and animals we find odd and easy to objectify, without letting these biases negatively impact the science. In this Element, Kristin Andrews identifies and critically examines the principles of comparative psychology and shows how they can introduce other biases by objectifying animal subjects and encouraging scientists to remain detached. Andrews outlines the scientific benefits of treating animals as sentient research participants who come from their own social contexts and with whom we will be in relationship. With discussions of science's quest for objectivity, worries about romantic and killjoy theories, and debates about chimpanzee cognition between primatologists who work in the field and those in the lab, Andrews shows how scientists can address the different biases through greater integration of the subdisciplines of comparative psychology.

The Animal Mind 2.0

In this fully revised and updated introductory text, Kristin Andrews introduces and assesses the essential topics, problems and debates as they cut across animal cognition and philosophy of mind, citing historical and cutting-edge empirical data and case studies throughout.

The second edition includes a new chapter on animal culture. There are also new sections on the evolution of consciousness and tool use in animals, as well as substantially revised sections on mental representation, belief, communication, theory of mind, animal ethics and moral psychology.

Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief

Since 2013, an organization called the Nonhuman Rights Project has brought before the New York State courts an unusual request―asking for habeas corpus hearings to determine whether Kiko and Tommy, two captive chimpanzees, should be considered legal persons with the fundamental right to bodily liberty.

While the courts have agreed that chimpanzees share emotional, behavioural, and cognitive similarities with humans, they have denied that chimpanzees are persons on superficial and sometimes conflicting grounds. Consequently, Kiko and Tommy remain confined as legal "things" with no rights. The major moral and legal question remains unanswered: are chimpanzees mere "things", as the law currently sees them, or can they be "persons" possessing fundamental rights?

  • In Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief, a group of renowned philosophers considers these questions. Carefully and clearly, they examine the four lines of reasoning the courts have used to deny chimpanzee personhood: species, contract, community, and capacities. None of these, they argue, merits disqualifying chimpanzees from personhood. The authors conclude that when judges face the choice between seeing Kiko and Tommy as things and seeing them as persons―the only options under current law―they should conclude that Kiko and Tommy are persons who should therefore be protected from unlawful confinement "in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice."

    Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief―an extended version of the amicus brief submitted to the New York Court of Appeals in Kiko’s and Tommy’s cases―goes to the heart of fundamental issues concerning animal rights, personhood, and the question of human and nonhuman nature. It is essential reading for anyone interested in these issues.

    Kristin Andrews, Gary L Comstock, Crozier G.K.D., Sue Donaldson, Andrew Fenton , Tyler M. John, L. Syd M Johnson, Robert C. Jones, Will Kymlica, Letitia Meynell, Nathan Nobis, David M. Peña-Guzmán, Jeff Sebo with an introduction by Lori Gruen and an afterword by Steve Wise.

    Routledge, 2018

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds

This volume consists of 49 original essays that provide opinionated introductions on topics including Mental Representation; Reasoning and Metacognition; Consciousness; Mindreading; Communication; Social Cognition and Culture; Association, Simplicity, and Modeling; and Ethics. The chapters are written by established and emerging leaders working in the Philosophy of Animal Minds.

See review by Bob Fisher (Metapsychology)

  • Enlarging the focus of philosophy of mind to include not just humans, but also other animals, has several advantages. First, in order to avoid a chauvinistic analysis of the mind, it is useful to consult a diversity of cases beyond the human case. Second, animals minds can shed light on human minds by being a foil for comparison. If we are interested in what makes humans unique, we need to have a good understanding of both the human cases and the nonhuman cases. Finally, given that other animals share with humans the property of having mind, we are morally obligated to understand those minds better, so as to better understand how we can ethically engage with the other species we live among.

    Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck, eds.

    Routledge, 2017

The Animal Mind. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition.

Scrub jays experienced in theft hide food from potential thieves, but naive jays don't. Dogs can learn the names of hundreds of objects. Dolphins modify their signature whistles depending on whom they are currently aligned with. Trout would rather be shocked than to be alone. The natural capacities of nonhuman animals can help us to better understand the nature of thought, emotion, consciousness, and social relations.

See reviews by Thomas Johnson (Philosophy in Review), Michelle Merritt (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences)

Read an interview about the book here.

Kristin Andrews
Routledge, 2015

 
 

Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology

Human apes are thought to be extraordinary mindreaders, knowing what others think and desire. But perhaps instead, they, like their nonhuman cousins, are skilled at reading others not by knowing the contents of their minds, but by understanding others as people, living within in a rich social and cultural context. Based on research from developmental psychology, social psychology, and animal cognition research, I develop and defend a theory of Pluralistic Folk Psychology, which decenters the role of belief attribution in our understanding of other minds. Furthermore, I defend a cooperative version of the Social Intelligence Hypothesis, following on the work of Alison Jolly, according to which the capacity to attribute belief facilitates the explanation of anomalous behavior, which in turn facilitates adopting innovative beneficial behaviors. Belief attribution isn't necessary for cumulative culture, but it sure can help.